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  In retrospect, the early 1990s can be regarded as a threshold in the 
post-war history of Japan’s political economy.  In the political domain, the 
half-century-long, one-party rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
came to an end in 1993.  By then it also became clear that the bubble in 
financial and real-estate markets had burst. These two events ushered in a 
period of unprecedented uncertainties, as well as various trials and errors in 
the polity and the economy in response to  them.  Economy-wise,  this  period 
is conventionally characterized as a prolonged deflationary phase1 and many 
have blamed the faults of the macro-economic policy for the malaise.  It 
became the fashion among the media, and even in academia, to dub the 
period a “lost decade,” referring to the losses of wealth, growth potential, 
secure permanent- employment jobs and even social morale.  Challenging 
this popular view, I have been maintaining for a few years by now that the 
past decade may be more properly characterized as a decade of flux, meaning 
an unfinished period of institutional change.2  
Underlying the apparent depression, competition among firms 
became keener during the period and managerial responses to the challenge 
of deflationary pressures, as well as the rise of industrial China, the IT 
revolution and so on, have steadily differentiated the better performers from 
the laggards and losers in the industry.  Through this process, economic 
practices have been undergoing various changes of substantial magnitude.  
In the political domain, the LDP eventually returned to the position of ruling 
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∗ This article is written as Afterwo d for M. Aoki, G. Jackson and H. Miyajima (eds.), 
Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity, to 
be published by Oxford University Press. The Table of Contents of the book is provided 
at the end of this article. I am grateful to Takao Kato, Curtis Milhaupt and contributors 
to the book for useful suggestions and critical comments. 
1    This popular characterization is somewhat mistaken in that the Japanese economy 
actually registered a positive growth rate in the mid-1990s.   
2 A series of my essays on this view were collected in Aoki [2002].   
 1party in coalition with other parties, but the continuity of its power could no 
longer be taken for granted without electoral support.  This competitive 
prospect in the polity has been ushering in gradual changes in the power 
structures of politicians and their relationships with various interest groups 
and bureaucrats.3  These changes in the economic and political domains 
have been mutually reinforcing each other.  Thus, I posit that although 
there may not have been any single event signaling a dramatic institutional 
change in either the political or economic domain, the cumulative effects of 
incremental changes are already substantial and irreversible.  This 
evolutionary process is still ongoing and it’s likely to continue for some time, 
even for another decade or more, for the reasons I will soon argue. 
A corporate governance institution, roughly understood as the 
accepted rules of the game among the corporate stakeholders governing the 
corporation, is not an exception.  In this domain as well, there have been 
changes in formal laws, practices, relationships with the polity, etc., so that 
the old rules of the game can no longer be taken for granted, but new rules 
are still being sought and are in the process of evolving.    However, this may 
be a good time for us to take stock of the cumulative changes achieved so far, 
and examine their implications and prospects with the help of the factual 
information and empirical analysis that has been assembled in preceding 
chapters of this book, as well as the analytical tools developed in comparative 
institutional analysis.  This Afterword provides a tentative note in that 
direction. 
It is composed as follows: Section 1 provides some illustrative 
evidence of changes that are taking place in Japan’s corporate landscape.  
However, without a certain conceptual framework, the anecdotal evidence 
alone may not be sufficient for us to infer whether Japan’s corporate 
governance is making a substantive institutional transformation; and, if it is, 
in which direction.  Therefore in the following two sections, we make a 
detour into theoretical discussions.  First, we discuss how corporate 
governance can be generally understood as an institution and thus its 
change as an institutional change.  Second, we present four stylized 
analytical models of corporate governance and try to identify the conditions 
that could make respective models viable (i.e., institutionalized).  Then in 
                                                  
3 See Toya [2005] for an early account of this process.   
 2Section 4 we return to Japanese scene and examine the driving forces, as well 
as the historical constraints, of changes in the corporate landscape.   By 
interpreting these factors in the light of previous theoretical discussion, the 
last section indicates that the nature of on-going institutional change in 
Japan's corporate governance can be interpreted as a possible transition from 
the traditional bank-oriented  model to a hybrid model, which attends to 
possible complementarities between a managerial choice of business model, 
employees’ human assets, and stock market evaluations.  External 
monitoring by an informative stock market would help, if not exclusively, 
evaluate the valuable internal linkage between a managerial business model 
and specific human assets.  Stock market signals summarize a variety of 
information, expectations and values prevailing in the economy.  However, 
for effective corporate governance to be implemented, there needs to be a 
further firm-specific mechanism to translate those signals into a 
selection/replacement of management, whenever appropriate, which 
constitutes the core of corporate governance.  In this regard, no single 
mechanism has emerged as a dominant pattern, but a variety of patterns 
seems to be evolving and a reason for it will be discussed.   
 
 
1. Changing Corporate Landscape: Anecdotal Evidence  
In order to highlight the changes taking place in the Japan’s corporate 
landscape in the past decade or so, let us first quote the stylized features of 
the preceding system, -- which we will refer to as the traditional J-system for 
the sake of referential convenience.4  They  are: 
    
¾  Top management of the corporate firm was considered the pinnacle of the 
career ladder for permanent employees. The Board of Directors, almost 
exclusively composed of insiders, functioned as a substructure of top 
management (the representative directors).   
  
¾  One of the main objectives of management was to provide steadily 
growing benefits to its permanent employees in the form of seniority 
wages, promotion opportunities, bonus and severance payments, fringe 
                                                  
4 See Aoki [1900], Aoki, Patrick and Sheard [1994] for a more detailed characterization 
discussion of the J-system.   
 3benefits and so on, subject to a reasonable level of profits (the so-called 
“J-firm”). 
  
¾  The main bank was the major supplier of funds to the corporate firm. 
Other financial institutions and investors expected the main bank to be a 
principal monitor of the firm (the so-called “delegated monitoring”).    The 
main bank did not overtly intervene with the management of firms in 
excellent corporate-value state, but was expected to decide whether to 
bail out and restructure firms in a critical corporate-value state at its own 
cost, or liquidate them (the so-called “contingent governance”). 
   
¾  The government regulated the banking industry to assure rents to 
individual banks according to their ranking.  It also intervened, if 
necessary, to bail out financially distressed banks or arrange for their 
acquisition by healthier banks (the so-called “Convoy system”).  More 
broadly, this system is embedded in the following unique 
political-economy institution. 
 
¾  One-party rule by the LDP was taken for granted. Under such political 
stability, triadic coalitions among LDP politicians, interest groups and 
ministerial bureaucrats were formed in parallel along various industrial, 
occupational and professional lines to protect mutual vested interests of 
the incumbents (the so-called “bureau-pluralism or “compartmentalized 
pluralism [shikirareta tagenshugi]).  
 
The traditional J-system characterized by these features started to ebb 
even in the 1980s.5  H o w e v e r ,  i t  w a s  o n l y  a f ter the bubble burst that 
changes became evident.    In contrast to the above features of the traditional 
J-system, we now observe:   
 
¾  Corporate Code reform in 2002 made corporate firms to choose between 
two options for board structure: the American-type system with 
independent subcommittees (on auditing, managerial compensation and 
nomination) or a modified traditional system with a semi-independent 
                                                  
5 An early account of this tendency by the author may be found in Aoki [1988], Ch. 7, 
particularly, pp.293-7.   
 4statutory auditor’s board (Gilson and Milahaupt[2004], Shishido 
[Chapter 11]).  By 2005, more than sixty major companies (including 
Sony, Oryx, Toshiba, Hitachi, Nomura Holdings) had adopted the 
American-type system.6  7Even among companies that opted for the 
second alternative, there seems to be some tendency toward including a 
greater number of outside directors, although the definition of 
independency of outside directors is not as rigorous as in Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 in the U.S. 
 
¾  The Boards and top management of listed companies are now 
increasingly exposed to the open evaluation of the stock market as a 
result of the unwinding of cross-stockholding (Miyajima and Kuroki 
[Chapter 4]).    At the height of the bubble, the holdings of tradable stocks 
by financial institutions rose to almost fifty percent of total stockholdings.   
They are now down to around twenty percent.  On the other hand, 
individuals and foreigners now hold close to fifty percent in a more or less 
arms’-length manner. Particularly, the propensity of foreign portfolio 
investors to trade shares more frequently strongly influences share prices 
and made exit a particular threat to firms (Ahmadjian [Chapter 3]).  A 
noticeable number of bank and securities company employees, as well as 
bureaucrats, left their permanently employed jobs and joined/formed 
investment funds or other financial service companies to take advantage 
of their expertise.8 
 
¾  Facing increasingly active and unpredictable stock market trading, the 
managers of listed companies are now much more alert to potential 
take-over threats.    One incident, which attracted wide attention, was the 
take-over attempt of Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (NBS: No 1 in 
sales in the broadcasting industry) by Livedoor Co., Ltd. (LD) in the 
                                                  
6 The Japan Association of Corporate Directors, a voluntary organization of directors, 
academics, lawyers, accountants, and so on, is campaigning to increase the number of 
corporations adopting the American-type system to 300 within a few years.       
7    A dramatic example of the consequences of these changes was the Sony’s Board 
action to replace top managements in 2005 in response to poor corporate performance, 
which was reported to be pushed by the active involvement of independent directors. 
8 A well known example is Mr. Murakami, a former bureaucrat of MITI, who manages 
MAC asset management funds worth several billion US dollars with aggressive 
American type stockholder activism. 
 5winter of 2005.9  LD quietly acquired more than 30 percent of NBS’s 
shares off the exchange floor, in lieu of open take-over bids, by taking 
advantage of a loophole in stock exchange regulations then.  The 
management of NBS attempted to counteract to the threat by issuing new 
equity subscription rights amounting to 150 percent of issued capital and 
assigning them to Fuji TV Network, Inc., a friendly company that owned 
12 percent of NBS.  LD appealed to the court for an injunction.  After 
widely publicized court debates, the Tokyo District Court judged that 
NBS’s plan was “unjust”.  It stipulated that “the Board of Directors, 
which is nothing but the executive organ of the corporation, shall not 
decide the composition of corporate control,” implicitly endorsing the 
doctrine of stockholder sovereignty.  Although the one who elicited this 
stockholder-friendly court judgment was ironically LD which was 
indicted later for illegal stock trading, spreading of false financial 
information and accounting fraud, this case is noteworthy in that 
judgments of the court are becoming critical to settling corporate 
disputes.10 Now the public debate is under way regarding whether the 
so-called poison pill should be legally permitted and, if so, under what 
conditions so as not to provide unconditional entrenchment for incumbent 
managers. 
  
¾  In 1995 bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) were busy figuring 
out ways to liquidate Jusen companies (Home Financing Corporations) 
which suffered from non-performing loans to land speculators worth 
seven trillion yen. Agricultural cooperative financial institutions were 
major lenders to these companies, while banks were major 
owner-cum-lenders. The agricultural interests were able to recover most 
                                                  
9 This company, founded by a then-college-student named Horie with Y6 million initial 
capital in the late 1990s, increased its market value to Y800billion in 2005.    But in 
2006 the top management was indicted by the Public Prosecutors Office for corporate 
account fraud and spreading false financial information.   
10 Another legal case which may be considered even more important than the case of LD 
vs. NBS in the sense of involvement of established firms is the one in which Sumitomo 
Trust Bank (STB) appealed an injunction of the merger of two mega financial 
institutions, Mitsubishi-Tokyo Financial Group (MTFG) and UFJ, in 2004 on the 
ground that STB had a prior agreement to be merged with the trust division of UFJ.   
This appeal was denied by the court, but it is said that since the incident even 
traditional firms have become very careful about how to draw contracts with each other 
in order to avoid possible law suits.   
 6of their loans to Jusen thanks to the infusion of public funds made 
possible by the powerful lobby activities of allied politicians.  Their logic 
was that the main banks should be the ones to assume major 
responsibility, not other lenders.  This case made the prospect of 
injecting public funds into the ailing financial sector enormously 
unpopular and the government grew timid about overtly engaging in it.  
Delays in injecting public funds certainly deepened and prolonged the 
magnitude of the financial crisis but it had the unintended consequence 
of eventually more or less alienating the financial authorities from the 
financial industries.  The Banking Bureau and Securities Bureau of the 
MOF, which had formed exclusive collusions with respective industries to 
protect the vested interests of the incumbents, were made 
organizationally severed from the Ministry in the 1997 Administrative 
Reform and were reorganized as the Financial Services Agency (FSA).  
The Agency became pressured to be engaged in monitoring the financial 
soundness of banks in arms’-length manner, sometimes even in an 
adversarial manner.  The restructuring of the banking and securities 
industries is now largely left to the private sector.  In this way, an 
essential feature of the so-called “convoy-system” seems to have been laid 
to rest. 
  
¾  Some of the overt attempts by the government to bail-out distressed firms 
did not yield good results, as was the case of The Daiei, Inc., a 
supermarket giant.   Direct and discretionary intervention in industrial 
restructuring by the government is now increasingly looked on with 
suspicion.  In response, the Industry Revitalization Corporation of 
Japan was funded with public funds for the purpose of more transparent 
public involvement in financially distressed firm, with its management 
recruited from the private sector.11  Civil Rehabilitation Law (2000) 
introduced a Chapter 11-like provision and gives incentives to distressed 
firms to file for bankruptcy earlier.  Foreign-owned equity funds, 
bank-related corporate revival funds and other financial services are in 
place and have replaced commercial banks as major players in 
                                                  
11 The Industry Revitalization Corporation of Japan now plans to complete its tasks 
and dissolve itself one year ahead of schedule because its missions seems to be 
successfully fulfilled.   
 7reorganizing/rehabilitating the financially-depressed firms (see Xu 
[Chapter 6] and Yanagawa [Chapter 7]).  Markets for corporate assets 
are growing in a size and scope that was never seen before the burst of 
bubble (Kikutani, Itoh, and Hayashida [Chapter 8]).  The number of 
M&A increased more than quadrupled between 1985 and 1995.   
  
¾  Some major companies have gone through large-scale restructuring by 
reducing the number of their permanent employees without necessarily 
breaking the long-term employment commitment by using of transfers of 
their employees to their subsidiaries and related firms, hiring freeze/cut, 
as well as early retirement.12  Macro-wise, between 1995 and 2005, the 
number of regular employees decreased by 4.1 million, while temporary 
employees in various categories increased by 6.5 million.    It seems fair to 
say that many Japanese firms still commit to the permanent employment 
system, but the core has shrunk (Jackson [Chapter 10] ).13 
 
¾  In the 2005 election of the Lower House, Premier Koizumi led the LDP to 
a landslide victory by campaigning for the privatization of Japan Post.  
This one-issue platform was meant to be targeted at the so-called 
“reform-resisting power,” i.e., coalitions between politicians (both inside 
and outside the LDP), specific interest groups, and the bureaucracy.  He 
succeeded in expelling those politicians opposing to the privatization from 
the LDP.  Thus the institution of buraupluralism seems to face a critical 
phase.14       
                                                  
12 For example, an integrated steel company reduced the size of permanent employees 
by more than half, although it was said to have cost them about thirty million yen per 
employee in severance payments and early retirement incentives.    Partly through the 
employment reduction and partly through the recovery of markets, its market value 
increased fourfold in 2005. 
13 Kato [2001] contrasted the job retention rates of Japanese and U.S. work before and 
after the burst of the bubble.    It turned out that the job retention rates of Japanese 
employees did not fall significantly from the period prior to the burst of the bubble 
economy in the late 1980s to the post-bubble period. 
14 After the end of the one-party dominance of the LDP in 1993, a change in the 
parliamentary election system from a multiple-seat district system to a single-seat 
district system was introduced and several elections have taken place since then in both 
the Upper and Lower Houses. In the old system, politicians from the same party 
representing different interest groups were electable in tandem in each district.    Thus, 
interest mediation within the ruling party and through the administrative process (e.g., 
budgetary expenditures, entry-restricting regulations) became a political focal point, 
 8 
The facts cited above are meant to be only illustrative at this point.    But 
in taking them together, it may be hard not to have an impression of 
considerable changes in the landscape of Japan’s corporate world and its 
environment.  But is this impression substantiated?  In other words, is 
Japan’s corporate world in general, and corporate governance in particular, 
undergoing an irreversible change?  If so, in which direction?  Is the stock 
market discipline going to exercise a dominant impact on corporate 
management as in the U.S.?15  Can the management afford not to heed to 
the voice of the employees any more?  Or, is the reduction in the size of 
permanent employees just an inevitable, temporary reaction to the 
prolonged deflation and does the old model still persist?  Alternatively, is 
Japan’s corporate sector in the process of an earnest search for a model of its 
own, adaptable to the evolving environment?  If so, is it moving in a “good” 
or “bad” direction?16 In what way are changes in the corporate domain 
related to changes in the political domain?  To consider these and related 
issues, it may be helpful to introduce first a coherent conceptual and 
analytical framework of institutional analysis, by which several prototypes 
of corporate governance structure, as well as associated fitting conditions, 
can be identified.   
 
 
2. How Corporate Governance Can Be Understood as an Institution   
                                                                                                                                                  
leading to the institutionalization of bureau-pluralism.  However,  after  the  electoral 
system change, it has become increasingly difficult for politicians representing a 
particular interest group to be elected.    Thus the power of the Prime Minister in 
policy-making and endorsing party candidates has been gradually strengthened. The 
2005 election may be regarded as a spectacular manifestation of this on-going tendency.     
15 Actually even in the U.S., some evidence seems to point to the rather weak stock 
market discipline (e.g., statistically significant yet economically insignificant 
pay-performance sensitivities and the “trouble with stock options”).    To this end, the 
ongoing controversy between the optional contracting school (e.g., Murphy[2002]) and 
the managerial power school (e.g., Bebchuk et al [2002]) may be important and 
informative.    
16 Such normative question is raised explicitly only by Dore [Chapter 13] in this book.   
Below I will not deal with the normative issue as such, but implicitly suggest ways by 
which evolving patterns could be improved for better corporate performance.    My 
stance may appear somewhat at odds with Dore’s critical position of the present trend, 
but this difference may be reduced to a difference in assessing whether the present 
trend is toward the American-type system (Dore) or not (myself).   
 9An important conceptual issue was first raised in a seminal debate between 
Dodd and Bearle in the early 1930s regarding whether the corporation is the 
property of the stockholders, or if the board should owe fiduciary duties to 
the stakeholders in general.  It does not seem that this issue has been 
resolved yet.  One view became more powerful and prevalent at one time, 
but then to be replaced by the other in response to emergent business 
landscape, particular events (such as the Asian financial crisis, the Enron 
scandal) and so on. Notwithstanding this unsettled fundamental issue, 
corporate governance has been regarded for a long time as a matter of legal 
design.  True, the kinds of recent changes in the structure and composition 
of board rooms in Japan, as referred to above, would not have been possible 
without formal changes in the Commercial Code.  However, even if formal 
rules are written, there is no guarantee that they will be followed and/or 
enforced as the legislators intended.17 Visions of corporate governance 
implicit in a law will become viable and sustainable only if it generates the 
proper incentives, expectations and calculations on the side of the concerned 
parties (stakeholders).  The case of the 2003 Commercial Code poses the 
issue in a straightforward and unique way.  The purpose of introducing the 
options in board structures, which Gilson and Milhaupt call “an enabling 
strategy of reform”, may have been to experiment with diversity and let 
evolutionary selection occur.  Law itself cannot implement diversity, 
however.    Only decentralized decisions by corporate firms will do.   
We may say then in analogy with the game that the law defines the 
formal rules, but what we should ultimately be concerned with are the “ways 
by which the game is actually played,” or what we may call the endogenous 
rules of the game.  The players may not necessarily follow the formal rules 
of the game; the referees (law enforcers and regulators) would not, or may 
not be competent to, enforce the formal rules; and the spectators (public) may 
                                                  
17    For example, the old Japanese Commercial Code was exceptionally generous to the 
stockholders in that a proposal for the election and replacement of the board members 
could be made at a stockholders’ meeting by any stockholder who owned at least one 
percent of the stock.    However, this statutory provision provided incentives among the 
managers to devise countermeasures to preserve their autonomy: such as implicitly 
colluding among themselves to hold stockholders’ meetings on the same day of each year 
or implicitly or secretly bribing professional trouble makers, called sokaiya, who 
collected minority shares. Such practices are now fading, however, because more 
stringent law enforcement and increasing public awareness of corporate social 
responsibility reinforce each other. 
 10jeer at the players/referees in one way or another.  Simplifying the 
game-like discussion, let us first consider only the following four generic 
classes of stakeholders as the players of the game: the investors who invest 
in financial instruments issued by firms; the employees who invest in 
organization-specific human assets; the manager who directs the use of these 
financial and human resources in “non-contractible” events,18 but who may 
have interests of his or her own (e.g., income, career concerns, perks, prestige, 
social reputation, etc.); and the consumers who collectively assess the 
activities of the firm by buying or not buying its outputs (i.e., the market).  
Depending on its market performance (i.e., market evaluation by the 
consumers), the firm may be roughly in either of three states in producing 
value: excellent, normal, or depressed.  The gross value added by the firm 
may be distributed among the investors, the employees, and the manager 
according to certain rules (by contracts, conventions, discretion, etc.).  Each 
of them may be happy or unhappy with the outcome.  In response, the 
investors and the employees will strategically choose their actions.  In 
particular, in the depressed corporate-value state, they may choose some 
punishment or non-cooperation against the manager, possibly with the help 
of other parties (such as the court, take-over raiders, reorganization 
specialists, industrial unions, the government, etc.).  In anticipation of 
these responses, the manager will adapt his behavior and choices in the use 
of financial and human resources under its command beforehand.   
We can then identify a firm’s corporate governance mechanism with a 
set of rules (formal or informal) that regulate the action choices of the 
stakeholders contingent on the value state of the firm.  In particular, the 
crux of such a mechanism may be in the managers’ behavioral beliefs 
regarding the plausible strategic reactions of other parties in the depressed 
corporate-value state.19    Such beliefs would in turn constrain and discipline 
his or her action choices ex ante (in other contingencies).  If such a set of 
rules is believed to operate generally across firms, we refer to it as a 
                                                  
18 The rights to control assets in uncontractible events, called the “residual rights of 
control,” are reckoned as the essence of property rights and are made the focus of the 
property rights theory of contracts and governance as represented by Hart [1995]. 
19 The point that the crux of governance lies in the manager’s selection is mentioned as 
early as Knight, who argued that “in organized activity the crucial decision is the 
selection of men to make decisions. …. all of which follows from the very nature of 
large-scale control, based on the replacement of knowledge of things by knowledge of 
men.”([1921]  p.297)   
 11corporate governance institution.  This corresponds to a situation in which 
typical parties will not expect a unilateral deviation from it to be beneficial 
so they will comply with it. 20  R u l e s  e m b o d i e d  i n  s t a t u t o r y  l a w  c a n  
constitute part of a corporate governance institution if every concerned party 
expects that the enforcer himself finds it beneficial to enforce them (fearing 
the loss of social reputation, punishment, public criticism, etc.).  But there 
are self-enforcing rules not necessarily enforced by the law enforcer.   
Examples of these are customs, self-enforcing contracts and agreements (due 
to reputation concerns, trust, etc.), implicit collusions among a subclass of 
concerned parties, and so on.   
I claim that this institution-as-self-sustaining-rules view has several 
advantages.21  Particularly, we can identify multiple sets of rules that are 
viable under certain conditions, thus a diversity of institutions, rather than 
enumerate them on an ad hoc basis or regard only a certain particular set of 
rules viable and/or normatively correct.  Certainly a set of rules to 
guarantee the “maximum returns to the investors” as the only “owner of 
corporate property”22 could be one possibility, but it may not be the only one.   
Furthermore, we can identify conditions, such as the institutional 
characteristics of the polity, prevailing social norms, labor relations, 
historical legacy and so on, that fit each of the possible models so that we can 
predict which kind of institution is likely to emerge under certain conditions.     
 
 
3. Four Prototype Institutions of Corporate Governance   
In the literature various types of corporate governance structures are 
discussed and their advantages and disadvantages are compared.  In this 
section I briefly describe four stylized models of corporate governance.  All 
of them except for the last are derived from rigorously formulated 
game-theoretic models.23  Thus all of them are bound to have unrealistic 
features in certain respects as a description of an actual corporate 
governance institution.  However, they can be useful for pinpointing 
                                                  
20 This corresponds to the “institution-as-equilibrium” view.    See Aoki [2001] and Greif 
[2006] for this view.   
21 For more detail, see Aoki [2001] particularly Chapter 1. 
22 This main-stream view of corporate governance is surveyed by Shleifer and Vishny 
[1997]. 
23 See Aoki [2001], chapters 5, 11 and 12.   
 12conditions of technology, institutional environments of corporate governance, 
etc., that would make them viable and efficient in the use of human and 
physical resources.   
 
¾  Stockholde -Sovereignty (SS Model).    This is the most widely discussed 
model, as well as the most widely supported, in the orthodox literature.   
An authoritative economic-theoretical foundation for this model can be 
found in the writings of property-rights theorists as represented by 
Hart, who argued for the inseparability of ownership and management 
as a starting point.
r
                                                 
24   A crucial assumption of his is that of 
complementarities between the managerial ability that is malleable 
with his/her effort and the right to control the use of physical assets in 
non-contractible events.  That is, the value of the manager’s 
incremental effort is assumed to be enhanced, if (s)he has discretionary 
rights for deciding how physical assets are to be used.  If this is the 
case, then it follows that it is more efficient for the manager to own 
physical assets, provided that (s)he is not financially constrained.  The 
employees may be contracted according to the level of firm-specific skills 
in which they invested.  The value that the firm produces net of the 
contractual payments to the employees accrues to the 
owner-cum-manager as profit. This is the case of a neo-classical 
proprietor-run firm.  If the manager is financially constrained and 
needs to rely on equity financing, then (s)he has to yield fundamental 
control rights to the stockholders and be subjected to an incentive 
contractual arrangement as an agent of the stockholders.  The present 
value sum of expected streams of profit accruing to the stockholders is 
called the fundamental stock value [Note the distinction between the 
(gross) value-added by the firm inclusive of contractual payments to the 
employees and the stock value of the firm as residual after them].    The 
fear of replacement in the job in the event of a financially depressed 
state (i.e., career concerns), as well as the prospect of incentive 
payments in the event of an excellent corporate-value state, motivates 
the manager to make the best effort.  Under this scheme, an investor 
who conceives of a new business plan to enhance the stock value may 
 
24 The following is an interpretation of the main points analyzed in Hart [2005] in the 
present context.    See Aoki [2001], p. 119-23.   
 13take over the firm through open bids in the stock market and replace 
the management.  This event can occur, even if the implementation of 
the plan induces the reduction of gross value-added of the firm and 
accordingly the breach/termination of (implicit) contracts with the 
employees.  The role of the government in this model could be that of 
the liberal state which would not interfere private employment 
contacting but only enforce private contracts as a third party.   
 
¾  Corporatism-Codetermination (D model). In the previous model, the 
employees are provided with incentive contacts for investment in 
firm-specific skills.  Let us consider an alternative situation in which 
firms are situated in an institutional environment of social-compact 
corporatism where the wage rates are regulated according to standard 
job qualifications through collective bargaining between the industrial 
association and the industrial labor organization, while the government 
allows bargaining outcomes to be legally binding to all firms in relevant 
industries.  Then an individual employer’s ability is constrained in 
inducing the employees to acquire and use firm-specific skills with the 
promise of firm-specific payments.  In such a situation, even if the 
interests of the manager and those of the employees are basically 
opposed in the distribution of control power over work (and the use of 
physical assets as a corollary), the sharing of control rights (e.g., in the 
form of the work council) will become of mutual interest.  A sharing 
arrangement can be extended to the stockholding company as 
co-determination in which the board members are shared between the 
representatives of both the investors and employees.25  This model is 
reminiscent of some basic aspects of corporate governance institution in 
Germany (thus the D-model referring to Deutch).  Contrasting this 
model with the previous one suggests that there are institutional 
complementarities between corporatism and codetermination, on one 
                                                  
25    In this setting, more external financing will be made in the form of long-term debt 
contracts than in the SS model. This is so, because in the context of co-determination, 
the investors and the employees have common preferences for debt-contacts in order to 
control the risky behavior of the manager, while the manager prefers to limit the 
residual rights of control by the stockholders. See Aoki [2001] pp.287-291 for a rigorous 
analysis. A proof of institutional complementarities between codetermination and the 
corporatist state is also given there.   
 14hand, and between private employment contracting and the liberal 
state, on the other.   
 
¾  Relational Contingent Governance (RCG model).  Instead of an 
exclusive complementary relationship between managerial effort and 
control rights over physical assets, assume that contributions to the 
gross value of the firm by the manager and the employees are mutually 
indistinguishable, while the physical resources supplied by outsiders 
are non-specific.  In this case, an efficient governance structure 
dictates that the insiders (the employees and the managers) ought to 
hold control rights in excellent and normal corporate-value states, as 
well as receive residuals after contractual payments to the outsiders 
(the investors).  As contributions of individual insiders to the total 
value are not clearly distinguishable, however, payments to them need 
to be regulated by organization-specific rules (such as payment by 
seniority, simple sharing, etc.) rather than as individual 
performance-based payments.  In financially distressed state a 
particular monitoring agent ought to gain control rights and decide 
whether firm-specific human assets should be bailed out for 
continuation value or punished by the termination of the firm in the 
worst case, depending on the nature and magnitude of the crisis.    Since 
the control rights shift between the insiders and the monitoring agent, 
contingent on the corporate-value state of the firm, this model can be 
called the contingent governance model.26    As bailing out is often costly 
than liquidation in the short run for the monitoring agent, some rents 
n e e d  t o  b e  a s s u r e d  f o r  i t  t o  b e  induced to assume the costs when 
necessary.  Such rents can be guaranteed, if the agent can expect 
stable fees from long-run relationships with multiple firms and/or be 
insured for the monitoring costs by the government.    Thus the position 
of the monitoring agent in this model vis-à-vis the firm as well as the 
government is relational so that the model may be characterized as the 
relational contingent governance (RCG).  However such arrangements 
may lead to a soft-budget tendency for the monitoring agent, i.e., it may 
tend to bail out firms that should be punished by the termination, 
                                                  
26 See Aoki [2001] chapter 11.3 for rigorous conceptualization and proofs of various 
properties claimed here. 
 15because it could be less costly for them with the government protection.   
Although this model is a purely theoretical construct, the traditional 
Japanese governance structure emulated some basic aspects of it with 
the so-called main bank playing the role of the relational monitoring 
agent.27  
 
From the above three models, we can deduce that three factors may be 
crucial in determining a viable form of corporate governance: the nature of 
manager/employees’ human assets and their relationships with physical 
assets and the government.    Namely, in the SS and D models, the individual 
skills of the employees, either firm-specific or general, can be identifiable 
and are made individually contractible, while in the RCG model they are not 
and their rewards can contain elements of firm-wide sharing of values/losses.   
Secondly, the SS model presupposes complementarities between the 
manager’s human assets and his(her) exclusive control over physical assets 
(that is, manager’s human assets becomes more valuable when (s)he is 
endowed with exclusive control rights over physical assets) through the 
stockholders’ agency relationship, while in the other models, the control of 
physical assets may be complementary to both the employees’ and the 
manager’s human assets (as in the D model) or to the employees’ and 
manager’s human assets combined (as in the RCC model).  Thirdly, in the 
former two models, the role of the government may be characterized as 
“neutral” in the sense of a third-party contract enforcer (the so-called liberal 
state as in the SS model) or that of enabling employees’ and employers’ 
organizations to jointly attain the status of quasi-state organs (the so-called 
“enabling state”(Streeck [1977]) as in the D model).  In the RCG model, the 
role of the government may become relational vis-a-vis the monitoring 
agents (banks) in assuring rents for them to make the model viable as an 
institution.  From these observations, the following fourth model may be 
suggested as another possibility.   
 
¾  External Monitoring of Internal Linkage (EMIL Model).  Somewhat 
                                                  
27 Some aspects of the relational contingent governance model may also be found in the 
relationship between the venture capital and the entrepreneurial firm, although it is 
not embedded in the protection of the government.    See Aoki [2000] and [2001] p.302 
and chapter 12; and Kaplan and Stromberg [2003].   
 16analogously to complementarities between physical assets and 
managerial human assets in the SS model, consider possible 
complementarities between the managerial business model and 
employees’ human assets.  The managerial business model is a set of 
managerial constructs composed of such things as: organizational 
architecture, market strategies, an organization-specific reward system, 
relations with the labor union, the design of work environments, and 
the formulation of organizational mission codes to be shared by the 
employees.    To repeat, complementarities imply that the employees are 
better off through being voluntarily associated with the relevant 
business model, while the business model can generate greater gross 
value by attracting and maintaining the employees willing to develop 
human assets specific to it.28  The function of the management of the 
firm can be considered as the creation and sustenance of this productive 
internal linkage.  Different from the SS model, the role of physical 
assets is regarded as secondary in that employed physical assets are 
composed of general-purpose machines, or relatively small in value in 
comparison to human assets.  If the management lets it be known as 
part of its business model that a proportion of the value created by the 
complementary linkage accrues to the stockholders according to a 
certain rule and if the stock market is informative, the fundamental 
stock value may be constructed as a summary statistic correlated to 
future values of the linkage.  If the board of directors is entrusted to 
effectively replace or appoint top management contingent on the 
(expected) stock value, the management can be disciplined to create and 
sustain a valuable internal linkage.  On the other hand, the 
stockholders themselves may be motivated to do a better job of 
monitoring if they can benefit from making good evaluative judgments.  
Therefore, there are complementarities between the creation and 
sustenance of internal linkage on one hand and the stock market 
evaluation on the other.    Complementarities can thus be dual; external 
as well as internal.  In this model,, the board of directors ought to act 
not as the agent of the returns-maximizing stockholders but as the 
“trustees” for the stakeholders including the employees and the 
                                                  
28 The importance of similar complementarities between the firm and the human assets 
are emphasized by Rajan and Zingales [2000] 
 17managers (Blair and Stout [1999]).    It would not force the management 
to increase the stock value at the sacrifice of the employees, because it 
would be likely to destroy the valuable internal linkage.  This model 
will work better if the government helps infrastructural services for 
stock markets to process corporate information more accurately and 
facilitate fair and equitable stock transactions.   
  
 
4. Factors T iggering Changes in Japan’s Corporate Governance  r
                                                 
As mentioned already, some stylized features of the traditional J-system as 
summarized in the beginning of Section 1 are reminiscent of the RCG model 
with the main bank serving as the relational monitor.  In the light of 
theoretical proposition in the previous section, it makes sense in that the 
sharing of information between the management and the genba (work spots), 
as well as among the genba, was an established custom within the J-firm 
facilitated by its practice of ambiguous job demarcation, job rotation, 
life-time internal career development, etc. 29   The RCG model-like, 
information-sharing practice co-evolved with the permanent employment 
system (the absence of active labor mobility), the main bank system, and 
bureau-pluralism as complementary institutions.30  On the other hand, 
contrary to frequently-made casual references to the “Rhein model”(Albert 
[1991]), the German-Japanese model of relational financing and the like, the 
comparison of the D model and the RCG model helps us understand that the 
Japanese main bank system and the German codetermination system cannot 
be simply lumped together in the same class of corporate governance.    They 
operated on quite different mechanisms in terms of industrial relations, 
contractual arrangements, selection/ replacement of management and so on, 
not to mention their differences in statutory legal arrangements.    Therefore 
we expect that there have also been path-dependent differences in their 
responses to changes in market and technological environments that have 
started to accelerate since the 1980s.  Let us briefly review some basic 
impacts of these changes on the Japanese system.   
First, the gradual opening of financial markets which started in the early 
 
29 For information-sharing within the J-firm, see Aoki [1988] Chapter 2, [1990]. 
30 For these institutional complementarities and their historical origins, see Aoki [2001] 
chapter 13. 
 181980s allowed better-run firms to rely on various financial instruments 
including bonds and equity issues abroad.  Japanese banks steadily lost 
better corporate clients and failed to adapt to this new market environment.   
As is well known, their soft-budgeting tendency was blown up into becoming 
one of the major driving forces of the bubble in the late 1980s, culminating in 
their own crisis after it burst.    However, the eclipse of the main bank system 
and the globalization of financial markets eased constraints for the 
management of the J-firm to experiment on various business models (see 
Jackson and Miyajima [Chapter 1]).  This is because institutional 
complementarities between a financial institution and other institutions (in 
employment, innovation, supply relations, polity, etc.) imply that a change in 
one of them can trigger changes in the other and create momentum for 
cumulative, mutually reinforcing changes – the phenomena conceptualized 
as dynamic institutional complementarities.  The presence of institutional 
complementarities is one reason for the robustness of institutional 
arrangements, but also can become a source for generating over-all 
institutional adaptations if the complementary linkage is broken 
somewhere.31    More on this to follow.   
Second, as product markets became more mature and globalized with 
technological innovation progressing at an unprecedented rate, the structure 
of industrial competition became more complex, making the expansion of 
shares in an existing market obsolete as a corporate objective as well as 
corporate evaluative criterion.  Competition over managerial business 
models becomes fierce across markets, continuously creating new markets.  
So a new mechanism of evaluating corporate firms has become a necessity.  
It became evident that banks, entrenched in relational financing, could not 
perform a proper monitoring role in this respect.    Instead, as we have noted 
already in Section 1, management of the corporate firm is more watchful 
than ever of stock market performance as an external evaluative 
mechanism.  
Third, the progress of communication and information technology 
introduced dramatic impacts on the value of (tacit) information-sharing 
among agents within an organization, as well as within a particular collusive 
                                                  
31 See Aoki [2000] Chapter 10 for analytical treatments of dynamic institutional 
complementarities and Chapter 10 for their application to the Japanese economic 
history since the 1930s. Also, see Aoki [2006] for a summary exposition.   
 19group.    As far as a primary reason for exclusive information sharing was the 
limit of available information channels, it has been steadily overcome by the 
increasing capacity of digitalized communications and the associated social 
demands for information disclosure and transparency.  Even some of the 
tacit know-how at work spots has become digitalizable through 
computer-guided design, computer-controlled machines and the like.   
People no longer need to spend most of their time communicating face-to-face 
with a fixed number of partners to gain useful information.    Mobile phones, 
the internet, e-mail and so on have dramatically changed the patterns, scope 
and range of communications among people.  These impacts of information 
and communication technology can be considered as one of most important 
reasons for the apparent erosion of competitiveness of Japanese firms, which 
were able to take advantage of the value of tacit information-sharing in the 
pre-IT revolution era of the 1980s.32   
In spite of all this, however, there still seems to be valuable 
information which cannot be digitalized, at least within a short period of 
time, but can be shared among a small number of people with particular 
common interests and complementary areas of competence, and are 
potentially valuable in generating new ideas (such as business strategies, 
technological innovation, work improvement on spots (kaizen), etc.).33  T h e  
paradox is that such information sharing in a niche could become potentially 
more valuable precisely because it is novel and scarce in the context of the 
increasing amount of information widely shared in the public domain.     
Indeed, we have observed divergent responses among Japanese 
corporate firms in this regard.  The better performers often belong to the 
type of firm that continues to foster and utilize valuable information-sharing 
among its employees in combination with the complementary use of 
emergent information technology.  This type may look superficially similar 
to the traditional J-firm, but there is a non-negligible difference that was 
shaped during the past decade or so in that the leadership of management 
                                                  
32 See Aoki [1988] and [1990] for the view that the competitiveness of the Japanese 
manufacturing industry up to the late 1980s was very much reliant on the use of tacit 
knowledge shared among the workers on the shop floor, as well as between the workers 
and the management, the R&D organization and the shop floor, and the prime 
manufacturer  and  suppliers.      
33 See Cowan et al [2000] and Aoki [2001] Chapter 12.1 for a taxonomy of knowledge by 
which some type of tacit knowledge may be regarded as economically valuable.   
 20plays a much more active role in terms of the design of organizational 
architecture that fits the new information technology (e.g., a flatter, modular 
structure34; spinning-off of affiliated firms rather than a large integrated 
firms35 ), a reward system to elicit employees’ cooperation and individual 
initiatives in a balanced way and so on.  Even on-site kaizen (work 
improvement) movement has been reformed with more emphasis on the 
active roe of the local leadership.36 In these firms the sustenance of the 
permanent employment system is still regarded as important,37 although it 
has been modified in terms of promotion schemes and reward systems with a 
certain degree of competitive elements (Jackson [Chapter 10]).  On the 
other hand, there seem to be two types of mediocre to problematic performers. 
Some of them were hasty in emulating the so-called Western style reward 
system based on individual performance evaluation, destroying the spirit of 
valuable information sharing. 38  The others are led by old-fashioned 
managers who confine themselves to passively mediating various interest 
groups within an organization rather than taking the initiative in 
formulating a competitive business model in response to the new 
informational and market environments.    They often try to rely on outdated 
collusive networks within the framework of ebbing bureau-pluralism in an 
attempt to hold on to losing ground.39
 
 
5. The Emergence of a Hybrid Model?   
In facing the challenges described above, Japanese firms have been 
strenuously trying to adapt their business models, human assets, and 
                                                  
34 For the innovativeness of the modular organization in a complex system, see Baldwin 
and Clark [2000]. See also Aoki [2001] Chapter 4, where the value of information 
encapsulation (modularization) is discussed.         
35 Kikutani, Itoh and Hayashi [Chapter 8] analyze this tendency of Japanese firms.   
36 For example, a field work by Kato (unpublished) shows that there is a more advanced 
and sophisticated case which introduced a full-time kaizen support group whose main 
job was to assist various kaizen teams by doing experiments for them. 
37 Consider the case of Toyota Motor Corporation that was downgraded by international 
bond rating companies immediately after the Asian financial crisis because of its 
permanent employment practices, but is still enjoying one of the highest stock values in 
the manufacturing industry.   
38 This type is conspicuously found among laggards in the electric machinery industry, 
once considered the most competitive industry.       
39 Miyajima and Kuroki [Chapter 4] detected that low-performing firms tend to sustain 
main bank relationships with mutual stockholdings.   
 21associated corporate governance mechanisms in one way or another.  As a 
result, the traditional RCG-type institution appears to be in eclipse as the 
behavioral beliefs and practices characterizing it cannot be taken for granted 
anymore.  On the other hand, a clear alternative pattern has not yet 
emerged as the universally accepted rules of the game regulating the 
interactions of the corporate stakeholders.  However, if we interpret the 
anecdotal changes described in Section 1 in the light of the theoretical 
models in the previous Section, we may interpret the emergent pattern as 
somewhat analogous to a hybrid between the EMIL model and the RCG 
model.  In general, the presence of institutional complementarities is 
thought to preclude the possibility of a hybrid institution. 40  B u t ,  a s  
discussed in the last section, the opening of financial markets has eased the 
constraints on institutional choice in other domains.  For example, some 
action choices that were not supported by the traditional main bank system 
may become viable in Japan. 
Indeed, diverse patterns are being observed, and will be observed for 
some time, in the areas of organizational architecture, employment practices, 
market strategies, supplier relations, industrial relations, and so on.41  
Those diverse business models need to be compared and assessed in terms of 
the values generated in possible cooperation with the employees’ human 
assets.  As a mechanism of evaluation of the value of the internal linkage 
between a business model and human assets, product market evaluations 
(thus current profit) are fundamental.  However, the product market can 
evaluate only the present outcome of the internal linkage, not possible 
outcomes in the future.  Also, a valuable internal linkage takes time to 
build.  In the previous section, I suggested that the bank may not be up to 
the task.  Although they may still be in a good position to find a worsened 
financial state of the firm relatively early, but their time-horizon may not be 
far enough in the evolving complex environments.  Instead, stock markets 
may be potentially in a better position to predict future outcomes by 
aggregating dispersed information, expectations and values prevailing in the 
                                                  
40 It is because the presence of complementarities normally involves the non convexity 
of sustainable choice combinations. See Aoki [2001], chapter 8.3.     
41 These diversities (particularly in organizational architecture) are described and their 
implications for institutional change are discussed by Jackson and Miyajima [Chapter 
1] and Sako [Chapter 14].   
 22economy if they can filter noises to a reasonably degree.42   O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  
last condition, which I will come back to shortly, is a long way from being 
taken for granted.   
Even if the stock market is hypothetically assumed to be informative for a 
moment, a corporate governance structure may not be complete with just 
that, however.  One  more  critical question still remains to be resolved: How 
can a stock market evaluation of an individual firm be used effectively in the 
selection and replacement of management at the firm level?    Remember the 
crux of corporate governance lies in the way in which management is 
selected and replaced when necessary.  In the RCG-like institution of the 
traditional J-system, the control in this respect was arranged in a contingent 
manner.  That is, in excellent and normal states of gross corporate-value of 
the firm, the mechanism was firmly gripped by the insiders (the top 
management was selected by internal promotion without any outside 
intervention), while in the critical state control rights shifted to the main 
bank.  In the currently evolving situation, the insiders seem to retain 
effective control as far as the corporate-value state seems to be without 
problem.  But who will exercise the disciplinary function in critical state of 
corporate-value?    No single solution seems to have been established yet.   
For small and medium-sized firms, as well as large firms with large bank 
loans, there may be still cases in which banks can perform major monitoring 
and disciplinary functions.  But for large firms with rather limited bank 
loans, not to say of those with no bank loans, the ability of the banks to 
correct poor management before a real crisis becomes evident is definitely 
limited, even if they play certain roles in arranging a bail-out or liquidation 
of failed firms ex post.43  Even in this case, the banks are not embedded in 
the protective framework of bureau-pluraism any more, as we noted already, 
so that their involvement may be more passive.44  One possible alternative 
to the bank’s disciplinary role would be to transform the board of directors 
from the traditional status of a management substructure into a 
                                                  
42 In fact, market prices cannot be completely perfect.    If all information available in 
the economy can be immediately and completely reflected in market prices, then nobody 
would be motivated to collect information. Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]. 
43 Xu [Chapter 6] provides evidences of the tendency for banks not to bail out distressed 
firms until bankruptcy is filed.       
44 However, Arikawa and Miyajima [Chapter 2] detected some evidences of 
soft-budgeting tendency toward laggard firms in the early 1990s.   
 23quasi-independent body that could discipline top executive management in 
critical state of corporate-value. As noted already, some firms may be 
heading somewhat in that direction by adopting a board structure with 
independent subcommittees or increasing the number of independent 
directors.45 How it will work has yet to be seen, but an experiment is 
certainly worthwhile.46  For start-up firms which are not mature yet for 
stock market evaluation, venture capital firms that act as sort of market 
surrogates in a relational manner are gradually gaining visibility.47  F o r   t h e  
time being, a variety of mechanisms may be tried for using stock market 
signals for the governance of individual firms, subject to evolutionary 
selection.48   
Even if stock market evaluation progresses in Japan, it is unlikely that 
Japan’s corporate governance institution will transit to an SS-type model 
reminiscent of the American system, however.  For one thing, a transition 
from the RCG to the RCG-EMIL hybrid model would imply a shift from the 
practice of sharing of information, responsibilities, and outcomes between 
the management and the employees, to the development of firm-specific 
complementary relationships between the two.  To repeat, these 
relationships presume more autonomous leadership roles of the 
management in designing business models than in the old CGS-like model, 
yet require specific employees’ human assets fitting, and associated with,  
the models.  This shift appears to be evolutionarily fitter than a shift to a 
clear demarcation of the management and the employees through individual 
contractual relationships as in the SS model.49  Therefore, it might be quite 
                                                  
45 One of the proposals that seem to be widely supported in the current discussion on 
corporate governance reform is that the provision of poison pill might be allowed if the 
board of directors, with a majority of outside directors, approves it. Such a stipulation 
might provide incentives for the company to make the board more open and 
independent.  
46 Gilson and Milhaupt [2005] suggests that, at least as currently structured, we should 
not expect too much from these committees. p 
47 See Hatta, Ando and Ishii [Chapter 5].    See also Aoki [2000], Kaplan and Stromberg 
[2003] and Rajan and Zingales [2000] for the nature of the corporate governance role of 
the venture capital firm. 
48 Another alternative is the model in which the founder family, albeit of relatively small 
holdings, exercises effective control over the executive management. Practices akin to 
this model can be found in companies like Toyota Motor Corporation and Suntory, Ltd.     
49 Abe and Hoshi [Chapter 9], as well as Jackson [Chapter 10], provide some empirical 
support for this prediction. They find that an increase in foreign ownership does not 
necessarily lead to a distinctive modification of human resource management, even 
 24possible that the voice of employees, implicitly or overtly, will continue to 
play a part in the managerial formulation of business models, if not directly 
in the mechanism of corporate governance as in the D-model.50  
Finally, I will add a few words regarding the relationships between 
corporate governance and the polity.  Needless to say, in order for an 
informative stock market to evolve, there must be an effective mechanism to 
filter the noise in processing corporate information and forming a 
fundamental stock value from it.  For that to occur, there must be shared 
beliefs among market participants that regulatory rules are formulated and 
enforced in such a way that corporate information will be disclosed 
transparently, but not in a way that stifles active trading among a broad 
range of informed participants.  Furthermore, these beliefs must be 
supported by an infrastructure of various competent professional services 
(e.g., accounting, the law, system engineering, financial analysis, academic 
theorizing and analysis),as well as trade-facilitating, information-processing 
technologies.  In these respects, Japanese practices have yet much to be 
improved.  Even though some reforms have been achieved in the past 
decade, noticeably irregular events have also emerged, such as the LD case, 
generated by deficiencies in regulatory rules as well as those revealing the 
inadequacy of the stock exchange infrastructure technologies.51  I t  w o u l d  
not be possible to entirely control the misconduct of some players who seek 
profits regardless of violating the law or take advantage of loopholes in 
regulatory rules in a shrewd manner.  But such incidents ought not to 
prevent nurturing the important function of corporate monitoring by the 
stock market.    There does not seem to be a better mechanism for evaluating 
and predicting uncertain corporate performances that summarizes 
economically valuable information dispersed in the economy, so we cannot 
help but try to make markets work better. 
In this regard, the changes in the polity occasionally referred to above 
may be relevant.    In the traditional J-system, the primary role of regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                  
though there may be some modifications of certain aspects.   
50 See an interesting contribution by Sako [2006] which documents and analyzes the 
emergent diversity in corporate organizational structure as a result of strategic 
interplays between the management and the enterprise union at the firm level.   
51 Immediately after the arrest of top executives at LD in January 2006, there were a 
tremendous number of sales bids, particularly by individuals of small holdings, which 
exceeded the system capacity of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and forced it to shorten 
trading hours for a few consecutive days. 
 25agencies was to assure the stability of the bank-oriented financial system. 
They did so by providing rents to banks in rather opaque forms of entry- and 
rate-regulations, as well as through backdoor agreements among parties 
concerned in bailing out financially distressed firms.  In these 
arrangements, the interests of bankers and their employees, and those of 
regulatory bureaucrats and politicians, were intricately interwoven.  But, 
as noted, the framework of bureau-pluralism in which such schemes were 
embedded is now in eclipse.  In fact, the waning of bureau-pluralism in the 
polity and various changes in economic and social domains mutually 
reinforce each other, making the reversal of either one alone less likely.     
Better-performing corporate firms and new entrepreneurial firms do not 
need the paternalistic, specific protection of politicians and the bureaucracy.  
The associations of life-time occupation holders (such as doctors, nurses, 
post-masters, contractors, etc.) are losing their organizational integrity and 
thus political influence, because the members of younger generations are 
more diverse in their values, expectations, and behavior.  These are some 
basic factors undermining the bureau-pluralism institution. 52   Thus, 
demands for deregulating rules aimed at protecting particular interest 
groups are rising, as well as demands for implementing rules assuring a 
broader spectrum of public interests (e.g., pension reform adapted to the 
rapidly aging population, remedying public finance deficits) and public 
safety (e.g., health, construction standards, child protection) are. The 
gradual transformation of the Finance Service Agency from an institutional 
agent of bureau-pluralism to a regulator sustaining an arms’-length 
relationship with the constituent industry, is nothing but a symptom of a 
bureaucratic response to these trends.  Such tendency may be more 
conducive to the development of an institutional environment for the stock 
market to become more informative.  The reason is that rules for stock 
market transactions, the disclosure of corporate information, and the like 
must be formulated and enforced in a neutral, arms’-length manner vis-à-vis 
concerned interested parties, but not by government in collusion with the 
incumbents in the financial market. 
                                                  
52 However, there is a danger that the protective framework of bureau-pluralism will be 
replaced by protective legislation enacted at the urging of the business community, in 
tacit alliance with those segments of the public who are disillusioned and indignant by 
some misconduct in the stock market and corporate world. I owe this comment partially 
to Milhaupt.    Also see Rjan and Zingales [2002] for related discussion.   
 26REFERENCES 
 
Albert, M. [1991], Capitalisme Contre Capitalisme, Paris: Seuil. 
 
Aoki, M. [1988], Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, 
Cambridge, U.K. and N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Aoki, M. [1990], “Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 28:pp.1-27. 
 
Aoki, M. [2000], “Information and Governance in the Silicon Valley Model,” in Vives 
[2000], pp.169-95.   
 




Aoki, M. [2002], Unwavering Coordinates in a Decade of Flux, in Japanese, Tokyo: 
Nikkei Bizinesuman Bunko.     
 
Aoki, M. [2006], “Mechanisms of Endogenous Institutional Change”, 
http://www.stanford.edu/~aoki/papers. 
 
Aoki, M., H. Patrick and P. Sheard [1994], “The Japanese Main Bank System: An 
Introductory Overview” in M. Aoki et al (eds.), The Japanese Main Bank Sys em: Its 




Blair, M., and L.Stout [1999], “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,” 
Virgina Law Review 85, pp. 247-328.   
    
Baldwin, C. Y., and K. B. Clark [2001], Design Rules: The Power of Modularity, 
Vol.1, Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.       
 
Bebchuk, L., J.M.Fried and D.I.Walker [2002], “Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,” University of Chicago Law 
Review.   
 27  
Cowan, R.P., P. David and D. Foray [2000], “The Explicit Economics of Knowledge 
Codification and Tacitness,” Industrial and Corporate Change 9: pp.211-54.   
 
Gilson, R., and C. Milhaupt [2004], “Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of 
Japanese Corporate Governance,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=537843. 
   
Greif, A. [2006], Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from




Grossman, S., and J. Stiglitz [1980], “On The Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets,” American Economic Review, 70. 
 
Hart, O. [1995], Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.  
 
Kaplan, S.N., and P. Stromberg [2003], “Financial Contracting Theory Meets the 
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,” Review of 
Economic Studies 70, pp.281.   
 
Knight, F. [1921], Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.   
 
Murphy, K.J. [2002], “Explaining Executive compensation: Managerial Power vs. 
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options,” University of Chicago Law Review. 
 
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales [2000], “The Governance of the New Enterprises,” in 
Vives [2000], pp. 201-226. 
 
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales [2003], Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: 
Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create W alth and Spread 
Opportunity, New York: Crown Business. 
 
Sako, M. [2006], Shifting Boundaries of the Firm, Oxford University Press.   
 
Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny [1997], “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journal of 
 28Finance 52: pp.737-87 
 
Streeck, W. [1997], “German Capitalism: Does It Exist? Can It Survive?” in 
C.Crouch and W. Streeck (eds.): Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, London: 
Sage,  pp.34-54.     
 
Toya, T. [2006], The Political Economy of the Japanese Financial Big Bang: 
Institutional Change in Finance and Public Policymaking, Oxford: Oxford 
University  Press.   
 
Vives, X. (ed.) [2000], Corporate Governance: Theoretical & Empirical Perspectives, 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 29Corporate Governance in Japan: 
Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity 
 




Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity 
Gregory Jackson and Hideaki Miyajima 
 
Chapter 2 
Relational Banking in Post Bubble Japan: Co-Existence of Soft and Hard-Budget 
Constraint
Yasuhiro Arikawa and Hideaki Miyajima 
 
Chapter 3 




The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding in Japan: Causes, Effects, and Implications
Miyajima Hideaki and Kuroki Fumiaki   
 
Capter 5 
Venture Capital and its Governance: The Emergence of Equity Financing Conduits in 
Japan 
Nobuyuki Hata, Haruhiko Ando and Yoshiaki Ishii 
 
Chapter 6 




The Rise of Bank-Related Corporate Revival Funds 
 30Noriyuki Yanagawa 
 
Chapter 8 
Business Portfolio Restructuring of Japanese Firms in the 1990s: Entry and Exit 
Analysis of Business Groups. 
Tatsuya Kikutani, Hideshi Itoh and Osamu Hayashida 
 
Chapter 9 
Corporate Finance and Human Resource Management 
Masahiro Abe and Takeo Hoshi 
 
Chapter 10 
The Changing Role of Employees in Japanese Corporate Governance:  Participation, 








The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform in Japan 
Hideaki Miyajima 
 
Chapter 13   




Organizational Diversity and Institutional Change: Evidence from Financial and 




Whither to Japan’s Corporate Governance?   
Masahiko Aoki 
 31